The Avro Arrow: Exploding The Myths And Misconceptions

Editor’s note: Today marks the 66^th anniversary of the cancellation of the Avro Arrow.  In recognition of this legendary Canadian achievement, the following story, based on archival facts and information, is presented. May Canadians long remember the saga of the Avro Arrow, and use it as inspiration for future national achievements.

On Friday, February 20, 1959, 14,000 employees were immediately fired and sent home, after a project they had been working on since 1953, was abruptly cancelled. That project was the military, supersonic, advanced interceptor, the Avro Arrow. The company they worked for, A.V. Roe Canada Limited, had come into being just after the war, with the express purpose of designing and building both commercial and military aircraft in Canada. Its subsidiaries included Avro, responsible for developing and building the platform and Orenda, for developing the engines.

The first project of this new company was the C-102 Jetliner, the first commercial inter-city jet to fly in North America in 1949, and the second jet to fly in the world, behind the trans-oceanic British Comet. After being test flown successfully for three years and with potential orders pending, the Jetliner project was cancelled, allegedly in favour of committing all company resources to the development of the military sub-sonic CF-100. The Arrow was to be the successor to the latter, designed to intercept and destroy if need be, incoming supersonic bombers coming across the North Pole, from the then Soviet Union.

The Arrow was a sleek, twin engine, delta winged aircraft embodying many advanced features such as fly-by-wire controls, titanium and magnesium alloys for light weight and resistance to frictional heat, transistorized electronics and an advanced engine, the Iroquois.  While some other aircraft may have included some of these advanced features, what made the Arrow unique was that all of them were built into this one singular aircraft.

Adding insult to injury, the five flying preproduction aircraft, including all technical documentation, tooling and jigs and fixtures and others in various stages of assembly, were ordered destroyed.  Why was a project being hailed by aviation experts around the world, suddenly cancelled?  In the absence of clear facts and in the presence of rumour and innuendo, debates have raged back and forth as to the reasons, sparking a series of myths and misconceptions about the entire affair.

In 1988, the late Canadian historian, Professor Desmond Morton, lamented the fact that he could not obtain any government archival documents on the Arrow, assuming they even existed.  Out of interest, I decided to try my own hand in this endeavour. Since then I have uncovered and have had declassified thousands upon thousands of records including many Secret and Top Secret, ranging from memos, reports both scientific and financial, to minutes of meetings and letters. The list includes some from the United States and Great Britain as well.

Those documents which I deemed more critical, I have either quoted from or have reproduced in my books, with full references.  Following is a discussion of some of the myths and misconceptions that the documents have helped clarify.

Arrow Destruction

Perhaps one of the most enduring myths is that the destruction of the completed Arrows and all else, was ordered by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, due to his hatred of the President of A.V. Roe, Crawford Gordon. Alternatively, it has been argued that it was Gordon who had everything destroyed as a spite against the Prime Minister. Neither account is true. 

The government records from the Department of National Defence clearly show the order to destroy came from the Minister of National Defence, George R. Pearkes, after receiving that recommendation from Hugh Campbell, Chief of the Air Staff, and after conferring with numerous others including the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Minister of the Department of Defence Production. The documents contain the signatures of those involved, all of whom would later deny publicly having any knowledge of the destruction, leaving the Prime Minister to be subsequently vilified for it. In fact, the paper trail ends with Minister Pearkes. The matter was not discussed with the Prime Minister at all.

Even today, when the Department decides to dispose of something – it does not matter if it is an aircraft, a tank, a ship or some other equipment – there is no need to seek approval or even advise the Prime Minister as to the manner of its disposal. In fact, all departments dispose of their equipment through an arm of the government. At the time it was called Crown Assets Disposal, but today it is renamed GC Surplus.  The name may change yet again.

Lack of Affordability

This remains the greatest misconception of all. There is no question that the Arrow development was costly. But, the documented records, which include a summary audit report as well as statements, many originally classified, from the Minister of Finance, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and others, do NOT support the contention that the project was cancelled due to a lack of affordability.

In 1958, the Minister of Finance at the time, Donald Fleming, is on record as having stated that in 1957 he had supported the Arrow development but that now, in 1958, it was the military that no longer wanted it. In 1957, a considerable sum of money had already been spent and yet the Finance Minister supported continuation. For their part, the military Chiefs of Staff, but not the Chief of the Air Staff, had this to say on February 6 1959:

“…they are still of the opinion that the changing threat and the rapid advances in technology, particularly in the missile field, along with the diminishing requirements for manned interceptors in Canada, create grave doubts as to whether a limited number of aircraft of such extremely high cost would provide defence returns commensurate with the expenditures.“

They were essentially echoing the words of a report they had tabled back in late August of 1958, wherein they had recommended termination of the Arrow for the exact reasons stated above. 

What they were saying was not that the Arrow was unaffordable but rather, that the capability they would obtain from a defence perspective was no longer there, due to a reduced requirement for manned interceptors which in turn was due to a perceived diminishing bomber threat in light of a change in threat from bombers to missiles. Put another way, they felt the bang for the buck was gone given that the Arrow was a defence against bombers and not missiles.

Earlier on in the development, the Minister of National Defence had stated in Parliament that the future of the Arrow depended on the threat and that as long as that threat existed the development would move forward. Everything was focused on the threat. Affordability in and of itself, was not the issue.

In his memoir, John Diefenbaker wrote:

“…However, the issue was decided finally by the inability of the Chiefs of Staff to report any new military developments that would justify the Arrow’s production…“

On a final note, government records show that at the end of March 1959, $262 million dollars in unspent monies from the Department of National Defence were returned to the government. Only $40 million dollars had come from the Arrow. The rest had come from other cancelled projects, overestimations in initial appropriations of money, and from the salaries of employees who had passed away or otherwise moved on. This return of money is routine and applies to all departments to this day.

In the case of the Arrow, that $262 million would have paid for the completion of the development as well as for the production of 37 aircraft.  According to an audit summary at the time, another 83 aircraft were to have been purchased at $3.75 million each, inclusive of tax. According to Avro, another 100 aircraft would have been sold for $2.6 million dollars each. All of this made the Arrow very much competitive with other aircraft that had been considered, namely, the single engined F-106.

American Pressure?

The notion that the US pressured Canada into cancelling the Arrow persists.  But did they?  The answer is complicated.

According to the Minister of National Defence George Pearkes, the US did pressure the Canadian military but it was for signing on to the NORAD agreement. This agreement though, led to the NORAD plan for continental defence. This plan included the use of aircraft and surface to air missiles, namely the American made Bomarc.

In interviews now available online, Pearkes stated that the American Deputy Secretary of Defense told him that Canada did not need to build the Arrow; that the United States had lots of aircraft. Pearkes further explains that in order to honour the NORAD agreement, he felt he needed to introduce the Bomarc missile, which would be the main defensive weapon for Canada.  But he noted that if he cancelled the Arrow, Canada would not have an air defence in the ensuing time before the Bomarcs were installed and operational. However, if he struck a deal with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, wherein he would allow American aircraft to train from Canadian bases during that interim period, he could cancel the Arrow and let the US handle our air defence should the need arise. This admission by Pearkes is startling to say the least.

Apart from this admission by Pearkes, in my first book, I published a letter obtained from the United States which noted that there was an agreement between Canada and the US in relation to the defence sharing arrangements; arrangements wherein each country would allow the other’s industry to bid on defence contracts. For Canadian industry this would mean having access to the vast numbers of American defence contracts. The letter though indicates that the Arrow was cancelled in part in exchange for allowing Canadian industry to bid on these American contracts.

I eventually discovered the minutes of a meeting regarding the defence sharing arrangements, also referred to as agreements, which occurred in 1958 and which were already declassified, in American archives. The meeting took place August 4th and 5th between American and Canadian officials. The first day was spent discussing the Arrow, noting that it was a good aircraft but that the US would not purchase it. The second day concerned the sharing arrangements. 

The American Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy said:

“…if the United States would get Canadian agreement not to engage in making complex weapons systems, but instead to turn its efforts to components, he believed the problem of joint production would be solved…

…[Canadian] Ambassador [Norman] Robertson pointed out that there would be numerous domestic and political difficulties if the Canadian Government tried to cancel the CF 105 program…

…Mr. McElroy repeated that he believed Canada should make components. Problems of tariffs and taxes could be solved…“

And there it is.  The US Secretary of Defense was offering an exchange for the termination of the Arrow.  At the time the Arrow was the only complex weapons system Canada was developing and Ambassador Robertson recognized immediately that this is the system the Secretary was referring to. It is interesting that according to McElroy, cancellation would help solve problems of tariffs, something being faced in Canada today.

The question remains though as to whether or not the words of McElroy influenced the decision to terminate. American officials believed that it did, and this is stated in an American paper written shortly after the cancellation. After acknowledging that the key reason for the cancellation lay in the diminishing threat and onset of missiles such as the ICBM, the paper continues:

“…The decision to terminate the CF 105 was predicated in part on the agreements to provide Canada with better chances to share in production of defence items of mutual interest…“

When the Arrow termination was announced, so too was the fact that Bomarc missiles would be installed in Canada and that the defence arrangements had been signed.

So, in answer to the question of American pressure, from the Minister of National Defence, there was pressure to sign the NORAD agreement which then had the follow-on effect of having the Bomarc missile introduced, which itself lessened the need to have the Arrow. But in addition, at least two attempts, if not more, were made to influence the decision to cancel, by both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States.

As for the diminishing threat, it became known rather quickly after the termination, that there was no change in threat from aircraft to missiles and the US began demanding that Canada purchase aircraft – this too is well documented. The alleged switch to missiles, known as the ‘missile gap’, had been inaccurate. A quick check on the website of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in relation to the ‘missile gap’, reveals documents that indicate the missile threat from the Soviet Union had essentially been fabricated. After termination, Canada purchased the Voodoo. Even though the Soviets eventually did obtain ICBMs, Canada purchased the F-18 and is now awaiting the F-35, to fulfil the Arrow’s role of policing Canadian skies against foreign intruders.

In the final analysis, it is unfortunate that most of the documents discussed, as well as so many others, were and have been unavailable for years, just as Professor Morton had opined. This has made it impossible to confront those involved, in order to obtain and confirm the truth of what really transpired in the Arrow saga, much like in the case of its predecessor, the commercial Avro C-102 Jetliner – but that is yet another story.