Wildfires: Options And Obstacles To Expanding Canada’s Waterbomber Fleet

Editor’s note: This piece was originally published on the Policy Hawk Substack, where you can find incisive analysis of Canadian defence and security.

Each year, as wildfires threaten and destroy communities in Canada’s north, the country’s capacity to fight them returns to the forefront of public attention. This year, that attention has intensified. Smoke has spread across Eastern Canada and into the United States, temporarily driving air quality to the worst levels in the world. The issue is no longer just environmental or public health-related — it has taken on geopolitical weight, with U.S. President Donald Trump threatening tariffs against Canada as a result of the emergency.

Notwithstanding the fact that intensifying fires in Canada (and, indeed, the United States) are closely linked to human-caused climate change — which the United States is the world’s largest contributor to — and that no realistic human effort can fully eliminate or even guarantee containment of fires in Canada’s vast boreal forest as it becomes drier, it is still a fact that Canada would benefit from investing in more wildfire fighting capacity than it has. And the position the U.S. has taken adds a motivation to ensuring that investment is highly visible.

Water bombers are among the most visible — and, while not a panacea, among the most useful — tools available, putting them high up on the list of ways Canada could choose to address this mix of challenges. They are not a panacea. Canada needs more of them. And it would benefit from having them sooner rather than later. Though it’s fair to question who should acquire them.

Wildfire response is primarily a provincial responsibility. But that distinction matters less in practice than it does on paper.

The federal government already plays a meaningful role. It is responsible for firefighting in national parks and uses that equipment and those personnel to support provincial efforts when possible. The Canadian Armed Forces are also routinely deployed to assist provinces during major fire seasons and provinces have consistently welcomed federal support even when it steps outside these technical boundaries — such as with the establishment of a Federal reserve firefighting fleet of 10 aircraft that are available through the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre.

More importantly, Ottawa has something the provinces do not: the ability to move quickly, at scale, and with national coordination. If Canada is serious about expanding its water bomber fleet in the near- or mid-term, the federal government will have to be involved.

Accepting this as sufficient justification to at least explore the possibility of the federal government acting to increase the Canadian water bomber fleet, the question becomes: Where could these water bombers come from?

The first, obvious, answer is that Canada buys water bombers from a company that makes water bombers. But there are, effectively, only four multi-engine aircraft being produced globally for this purpose and none are available in meaningful numbers on short timelines.

The first is Russia’s Beriev Be-200, which is a large amphibious aircraft marketed capable of firefighting among a number of other purposes. However, with only 20 delivered since it first flew in 1998, and none since 2023, it is unlikely it could be delivered in significant numbers to Canada any time soon. Geopolitical factors — which is to say, Russia’s on-going murderous occupation of parts of Ukraine and attempted brutal invasion of the rest of that nation, and the resultant sanctions from civilized countries, including Canada, the world over — also make it an unappealing choice.

A second that may be in-delivery is the new Chinese AVIC AG600. A prototype of this aircraft first flew in 2017 with deliveries expected in 2022, however that was later pushed back to 2025, and it is unclear if it met that target. It would also face similar, if less acute, geopolitical barriers to an aircraft from Russia.

An option without that geopolitical baggage is the Frégate-F100, being developed by Hynaero in France. But it’s early in development by an unproven company that, even if things go well, is only promising delivery by 2032. It would be longer before Canada could acquire any, and longer still before being available in significant numbers. Canada can not wait.

That leaves the most obvious candidate: Canada’s own CL-215/415 lineage — the “Super Scooper” family — now being revived as the DHC-515. Though its production timeline is also less than ideal.

Production of the aircraft, called the DHC-515 in its latest iteration, only resumed in 2022. Initial deliveries are not expected until 2028, with at least the first 20 aircraft already allocated to European customers. Canadian provincial orders exist — including from Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario — but none are expected before 2030 and additional orders placed today would not enter service until 2032 or later.

It’s also not clear that this timeline is easily changed. Expanding the existing production line is likely to create disruptions that slow deliveries in the immediate future. Establishing a second production line would likely take years — the current line itself is taking roughly six years from initial work to first delivery — so that doesn’t provide an obvious path to getting aircraft sooner and would only make sense if sustained demand exceeded the projected full-rate output of roughly 12 aircraft per year which is probably sufficient, as it could replace the entire Canadian-based Super Scooper fleet in less than 5 years. It’s probably telling that the manufacturer, De Havilland Canada, has not publicly promoted either of these ideas.

These are, with a few even more problematic caveats, the only options for purpose-built water bombers anywhere in the world. The conclusion all this leads to is that while Canada would benefit from ordering more of them, and there’s little reason to order anything other than the domestically built DHC-515, none of these options are likely to meaningfully expand Canada’s water bomber capacity this decade.

And current pressures suggest this is not a decade Canada can afford to wait out.

If purpose-built aircraft cannot arrive in time, the only viable alternative is conversion.

A wide range of aircraft can be adapted for firefighting, but not all are equally useful in the Canadian context. Because of its expansive geography, the size of its wildfires, and the time constraints, Canada is looking for a multi-engine aircraft with proven conversion pathways and sufficient availability on the secondary market.

One aircraft that fits this description is the Canadian built Dash-8. With over 1200 of this aircraft built between 1983 and 2022 it’s a popular regional airliner with at least a dozen examples of water bomber conversions. Because of its long history, and the fact that it’s a favourite of smaller airlines that often face financial difficulties that lead to selling off aircraft, it’s easy to acquire, maintain, and to find operators for. In its modified form, the Dash-8 can carry as much as 10,000 litres of fire retardant or water.

The Boeing 737 is another strong candidate. As the most prolific airliner ever built, it is widely available and well supported. At least five have already been converted into water bombers by the Canadian company Coulson using their proprietary Retardant Aerial Delivery System (RADS-XXL), and a number more are on order. After conversion, these 737s can drop up to 15,000 litres of fire retardant or water.

Both are viable. Neither is the most interesting option.

Canada already owns and operates a fleet of C-130 Hercules aircraft. Until recently, that fleet included 29 aircraft, split between 17 modern C-130J variants and 12 older C-130H models now being pushed toward retirement.

A recent assessment by research consultant Steffan Watkins, using publicly available information, suggests only four of the older C-130Hs can be confirmed to have flown since early June 2026, with several appearing idle for months at their depot in Abbotsford. However, all but one have flown within the past year and — critically — all appear to remain in Government of Canada possession.

The status of the C-130Hs is important because the RADS-XXL installation requires significant modification to an airframe. After modification, the most bulky component — the water tank and attachments — are designed to be taken on and off the aircraft. However significant piping, hydraulic systems, and a pair of belly doors must be permanently installed. This means that while a modified C-130 can be used for other functions, such as in a transport role, its capacity is likely diminished and there will be concern about damaging its firefighting systems when used at its limits.

For that reason, the RCAF is unlikely to accept these modifications on its active C-130J fleet. But the retiring C-130Hs present a different opportunity.

Some are at the end of their service life. Others are not — and would likely be sold to commercial operators, where one probable outcome is their eventual conversion into water bombers for contract work.

Letting them be sold to companies likely to convert them to water bombers is a low friction way to get more water bombers in the world, but it doesn’t guarantee their availability in Canada during our wildfire season as demand for water bomber services exists around the globe.

Canada could instead retain these aircraft and convert them domestically. The question then becomes how it would operate them.

Conceivably the RCAF could continue to maintain and fly them. This would have the added benefit of giving them a contingency “surge” air transport capacity as well. However, that would present personnel challenges for an already stretched organization, and it’s unlikely to have RCAF support as they’ve already decided to part with these aircraft. It may, therefore, be better to allow a federal civilian agency to operate them, or else to sell or lease them to provinces. The government could even choose to lease them to private firms. It may seem counter-intuitive to lease them to the same corporations we would otherwise sell them to, however, by keeping ownership it’s possible to ensure through lease terms that they prioritize Canadian service when needed.

Coulson has demonstrated the ability to convert at least three aircraft per year using the RADS-XXL system. Even accounting for existing commitments, that implies a pathway to expanding Canada’s firefighting capacity within a few years — much sooner than purpose-built aircraft could arrive — and one that could likely be scaled up more easily than aircraft production.

A second system that could be used to make use of the latent firefighting capability in Canada’s C-130 fleet is the US made Modular Airborne FireFighting System (MAFFS). This system is smaller than the RADS-XXL in capacity, at 11,000 litres, and drops water or fire retardant more slowly, but has the benefit of requiring no modification to the aircraft, and can be loaded and unloaded onto any C-130 when needed.

This opens the possibility of using the RCAF’s C-130Js and not just the C-130Hs, as aircraft that use MAFFSs can quickly go back into use for other roles without any impact on their ability to perform those other roles. The flexibility inherent in this approach also increases the systems’ availability. Aircraft are sometimes unavailable for maintenance, if a system requires an aircraft to be converted, that specific airframe being under maintenance means the firefighting system aboard is also unavailable. A completely modular system like MAFFS can always be put into use, as long as any C-130 is available to carry it.

The biggest obstacle to this idea is that Canada’s C-130J fleet was sized for a defined set of missions. Firefighting was not one of them. Every aircraft being used as a water bomber means one less aircraft available for transport, logistics, search and rescue, and other operations they were acquired for. That has a negative impact on Canadian security.

The government could, of course, choose not to assign C-130Js to operate as water bombers except when availability allows. However, it will be very politically difficult for the government to tell Canadians who are impacted by wildfires that its fleet of C-130Js isn’t helping them because it’s too busy with more important taskings.

If Canada has MAFFSs for RCAF aircraft, Canadians will expect to see those aircraft being used to fight fires. And with the Canadian wildfire season lasting over half a year, that’s a significant drain on the RCAF’s transport resources.

There are ways to offset this. Additional C-130Js could be procured — the aircraft remains in production. But that just shifts the limitation from the number of airframes to the number of personnel available to maintain and operate them. The RCAF is already stretched, managing multiple procurement programs while attempting to rebuild operational capacity. Expanding the fleet without expanding the force solves little, and expanding the force will take years — it’s not the near-term solution Canada needs.

Balancing this is difficult, and presumably one of the reasons why the RCAF has never been given this capability. However, it’s undeniable after the last week that wildfires aren’t just an environmental challenge for Canada, they’re also a national security threat. And with the CAF’s purpose being to protect Canada against threats to its security, it probably can’t expect to play no role.

A more workable approach may combine these options.

Retiring C-130Hs could be equipped with MAFFSs and operated outside the RCAF — by a federal civilian agency or through structured leasing arrangements — preserving capacity without imposing full operational burden on the military.

At the same time, the RCAF’s C-130Js could provide surge capacity. When the civilian-operated C-130Hs are unavailable due to maintenance, crew limits, or operational demand, the MAFFSs could be transferred to available RCAF C-130J.

This would still create training and operational requirements for the RCAF. But it would be a smaller, more flexible burden — and one that could be deprioritized when needed with a much lower political risk.

Canada’s problem is not a lack of options. It is that every option comes with obstacles that cannot be wished away.

Purpose-built aircraft exist, but not on timelines that meet the current need. Converted aircraft can be fielded quickly, but require trade-offs in flexibility, ownership, and operational control. Military platforms can fill gaps, but only by displacing other missions.

The temptation is to wait for a clean solution: more DHC-515s, expanded production, a larger dedicated fleet. That solution is coming. It is also years away.

Wildfires are not waiting.

U.S. impatience, however unreasonable, is not waiting.

Canada does not need a perfect answer. It needs capacity — now — both for its utility and visibility. That requires a willingness to accept the imperfect solutions. The longer those trade-offs are deferred, the more they will be made under pressure, in worse conditions, and at higher cost.